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Communication versus Value. 
On Two Places 
of the Interpretation of Music
In relation to the mystery of the work of art, of the literary or 
musical work, in relation to that ‘deep text’, being the seat of essential, 
integrating sense, interpretation takes on the dimension of a ‘cognitive 
drama’; it is the scholar’s expedition, filled with surprising events, into 
the unknown ‘alien world of the work’, gradually unveiled, but never ul­
timately mastered. According to Janusz Sławiński, who has investigated 
the ‘place of interpretation’ of the literary work, the discovery of that 
alien world, the overcoming of the otherness of the work, is effected in 
three ways: through analytical dismemberment, aimed at discovering 
familiar, standard elements; through establishing patterns of reference, 
contexts; through penetrating the heart of the work’s semantic structure 
in the quest for the root sense, which lies beyond contextual relativisa­
tions.1 Thus the scholar’s path is delineated by the analysis, interpreta­
tion and evaluation of the work — three aspects that are in practice in­
separable, conditioned, as they are, by interdependencies.
In the analytical approach, Sławiński distinguishes four separate 
paths, marked out by rival conceptions of the structure of a work: the 
most traditional distinction between content and form competes with the 
tectonic conception, the phenotype/genotype conception and a fourth con­
ception which treats the work as a kind of communicational situation, di­
recting attention towards dialogue and interpersonal relations.2 The 
choice of one of these paths determines a further route in search of the 
hidden scheme of references within the work. Adopting the evaluative 
approach, meanwhile, signifying the striking-up of a lively dialogue with
1 Janusz Sławiński, Miejsce interpretacji [The place of interpretation] (Gdańsk, 
2006), 64.
2 Ibid., 26-27.
the work and — through it — with its creator, as one of the forms of inter- 
pretational activity, is present in its initial phase, since the work, a uniquely 
organised entity, challenges the receiver to pass emotional judgment, 
demands subjective, emotional involvement and response to value.3
In Slawiriski’s proposition of situating the ‘art of interpretation, defin­
ing its area, within the realm of academic knowledge about literature’, 
one’s attention is drawn to two points in particular, to two places of the 
interpretation of the work, resulting from its immanent and at once also 
universal properties: the aspects of communication and value. These as­
pects are all the more crucial in that they concern not only literary 
works, but all fields of art. And so taking the trouble -  on this level of 
generality -  to consider the interaction of these aspects that occurs in in- 
terpretational activity might -  one would expect -  bring benefits for re­
flection on music as well, for the analysis, interpretation and evaluation 
of the musical work.
An essential priority here will be to examine the notion of communi­
cation. It is a truism that limiting its scope to the transmission of infor­
mation, inadequate even in relation to any form of linguistic activity, 
would lead to a particularly advanced reductionism in the case of the 
work of art: of literature, fine art or, even more so, music. This last artis­
tic discipline, where protests against treating music as merely a bearer of 
data have been particularly forceful, emphasising its autonomy from (oc­
casionally present) extra-musical content, perhaps best brings home the 
absurdity of such a reductionist view.
Meanwhile, the expression ‘communicating oneself, so readily adopted 
by musicology from literary theory, is supposed to illuminate the peculi­
arity or distinctness of the act of literary, poetic or musical communica­
tion, irreducible to relations and values of any other type.
And yet could it possibly be wholly adequate to explain the distinct­
ness of the transmission of aesthetic communication by means of Roman 
Jakobson’s law that poetical function involves transferring the principle 
of equivalence from the axis of sign selection (paradigmatics) to the axis 
of combinations (syntagmatics), and, as a consequence, focussing on the 
form4 of the message?5
3 Ibid., 6-7.
4 And can one not detect in Jakobson’s rule, in relation to the work of art, the tra­
ditional distinction between form and content? How useful is it as a tool for bringing 
order to transcoding, the multiplication of language and palimpsestness, frequently 
invoked for the diagnosing of the nature of contemporary acts of communication?
5 See Aleksander Kiklewicz, Język, komunikacja, wiedza [Language, communica­
tion and knowledge] (Mińsk, 2006), 58-59.
Michał Głowiński perceived this peculiarity of communication in the 
literary work in the arising of a particular tension between the emitter 
and the receiver of literary ‘communication’, in the forming of a commu- 
nicational situation marked by structural asymmetry, by a difference in 
the roles of its participants -  a relationship made manifest in the context 
of the literary trend.6
In order to seek, following the path beaten by Głowiński, a satisfac­
tory answer to the above-discerned questions as to the extent to which 
the notion of communication is inscribed in the specific nature of works 
belonging to a particular artistic discipline (both ‘representational’ art 
and also art devoid of the element of representation) and the extent to 
which this notion may be helpful in fathoming the secret of the work, ref­
erence should be made to the most broadly understood, existential, no­
tion of communication, embracing the entirety of the human organism’s 
interaction with its living environment, occurring on many levels — from 
the organic, the physical, to the spiritual.7 Communication is then per­
ceived -  in its broadest understanding -  as a way of acquiring knowledge 
about existence, as the experiencing of the world by the human individ­
ual, and particularly as the experiencing of oneself and of others.
Such an understanding of the notion of communication means placing 
its point of gravity, not in the fact of communicating, but in the domain of 
the person, of his/her world of experiences, his/her relationships with 
other persons and their experiences. Were we to decide on a reduction of 
this kind and to narrow down the notion of communication to interper­
sonal relations, it would turn out that -  to use the language of Em­
manuel Levinas -  the foundation of communication is ‘a radical shift 
from cognition to solidarity’, seeking understanding with another person, 
the forming of a bond involving responsibility, which gains the status of 
a sine qua non. This is because, ‘[...] communication is only possible in sac­
rifice, which means coming closer to that person for whom one is respon­
sible’; it requires one to abandon the cautious protection of the I and the 
radical opening-up to the Other, ‘ [...] a transcending of oneself and ex­
propriation, a convulsion in which “I” [...] am sacrificed’.8 In the fact of 
communication understood according to Lévinas’s interpretation, the
6 Michał Głowiński, Dzieło wobec odbiorcy. Szkice z komunikacji literackiej [The 
work and its receiver. Sketches from literary communication] (Kraków, 1998), 26-29.
7 Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin, Don P. Jackson, Menschliche Kommunikation: 
Formen, Störungen, Paradoxien (Bern and Stuttgart, 1969), 239 ff. [Eng. orig. Prag­
matics of Human Communication (New York, 1967)].
8 Emmanuel Lévinas, Inaczej niż być lub ponad istotą, trans. Piotr Mrówczyński 
(Warsaw, 2000), 200-201 [Fr. orig. Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l ’essence (Ha­
gue, 1974)].
question of the transmission of data, the acquisition of knowledge, is all 
but absent, and certainly recedes into the background.
There is no question that this radical change, observed by Levinas, 
that occurs in subjects communicating with one another, their mutual 
opening-up and self-sacrificing, the forming of a relationship of responsi­
bility between persons through the situation of communication, of dia­
logue, leads directly to the need to incorporate ethical questions into dis­
cussion of the places of interpretation of the artistic work, as their actual, 
albeit perhaps unperceived, foundation.
So should the answer to the question as to the specific nature of the 
communication realised by the work of art, and of the musical work in 
particular, be sought in the realm of ethics? After all, the work undoubt­
edly contains the chance for interpersonal relations to arise, involving 
a dialogue between the creator and the receiver, in which the principle of 
asymmetry places both participants in the act of communication within 
the field of responsibility.
This axiological trail of reflection seems all the more permissible (and 
all the more appealing) in that it constitutes a significant contrast to the 
antihumanism ubiquitously propagated today -  that negative reply to 
the question of man’s connection with himself, with others and with the 
world.9 But given the collapse of meaning, the fall of ideology, the tri­
umph of individualism and ‘ethical emptiness’, may we expect any help 
in our deliberations over the nature of the work of art from ethics? In de­
scribing the current state of this axiological discipline, Jacqueline Russ 
states that, paradoxically, it is in the very topos of ethical emptiness that 
the ethics of the present is born, that a ‘new ethics’ emerges, revealing 
the axiological foundation on which it will be possible to validate the 
world of human culture.10 It is the tenet of responsibility that becomes 
the foundation of this ethics.
The symptoms of disorientation in contemporary art, humanities or 
culture that can be observed in the writings of many thinkers need not 
lead to agnosticism and a sense of defeat, as there also exist diagnoses of 
the situation of culture in the postmodern era which are aimed at heal­
ing. The most perspicacious of these, focussing attention on analysing the 
condition of contemporary man, undoubtedly include the detailed study 
of the crisis in the humanities and the crisis of human identity, explain­
ing the reasons for disorientation in our understanding of the truth about
9 Andrzej Miś, Filozofia współczesna: główne nurty [Contemporary philosophy: 
the principal currents] (Warsaw, 2006), 222.
10 Jacqueline Russ, Współczesna myśl etyczna, trans. Agnieszka Kuryś (Warsaw, 
2006), 5 ff [Fr. orig. La pensée ethique contemporaine (Paris, 1998)].
man and showing us the way back from a ‘defective anthropology’ to an 
‘adequate anthropology’, contained in the thinking of John Paul II.11 The 
accuracy of the diagnosis formulated by Karol Wojtyla results from his 
philosophical conception of man, of the human being, that has crystal­
lised gradually over a succession of works.
Wojtyla presents a phenomenological analysis of man, based on the 
identification of the source experience of the human being in the act. 
‘Man acts’: this dynamic conjoining, strict correlativity, semantic equiva­
lence and co-dependence of ‘act’ and ‘person’ allows us to regard the act 
as a particular moment in which a person reveals himself -  the most ap­
propriate starting point for understanding his dynamic essence.12 The act 
is conscious action; actus humanus is actus voluntarius. In this way the 
personalistic value of the act is constituted: its accomplishment is in it­
self a value, which conditions and anticipates moral value, which always
-  and exclusively -  belongs to the human being. The ‘person/act’ is an in­
tegral whole; in the act, the person, constituting a psychophysical unity, 
manifests itself: ‘When I act, then I am whole in my action, in this dy­
namising of my own “I” to which I have causatively contributed’.13 Hence 
a person becomes, through morally good or bad acts, good or bad himself.
The work of art, being a particular kind of message, is at the same 
time a human act, a bearer of values, not only containing its own value 
as an object made by the hand of its creator, but also -  in some way -  
manifesting, revealing the value of its creator. In this way we may ex­
plain the strict connection, postulated by Roman Ingarden, between the 
work of art and the person, who forges a bond with it or who creates it. 
On this basis, Ingarden states that the value of the work of art justifiably 
expects an adequate assessment and recognition of its specificity by those 
who come into contact with it.14
Thus the act of communication, the medium of which is the work of art 
(and the work of music), ultimately involves the communication of value.
This conclusion prompts one to pose further questions, concerning the 
kind of values that are transmitted and their structuring. Is it possible to 
discover a single supreme value which could be called constitutive, essen­
tial, for the work of art as such? Were the answer positive, then perhaps
11 Jan Galarowicz, Blask godności. O etyce Karola Wojtyły i nie tylko [The splen­
dour of dignity. On the ethics of Karol Wojtyla and more] (Kęty, 2005).
12 Karol Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn [Person and act] (Kraków, 1969), 13-15.
13 Ibid., 202-203.
14 Roman Ingarden, ‘Phenomenological Aesthetics: an Attempt at Defining its Range’, 
in Phenomenology. Critical Concepts in Philosophy, vol. 3 Phenomenology on Science, 
Art, and Ethics, ed. Dermot Moran and Lester E. Embree (London and New York, 
2004), 202.
an attempt to rebuild the deconstructed twentieth-century aesthetics, to 
find for it an axiological foundation, would have a chance of succeeding.
A certain orientation for deliberations in the field of axiology may be 
the aspect of the work understood as an act of communication, and espe­
cially its dialogical dimension, the place where interpersonal connections 
are formed. In this context, it becomes evident that the autonomy of aes­
thetic value, established by Immanuel Kant and later undermined on 
numerous occasions, is inadequate. Beauty, which Kant relates to the 
sphere of subjective emotions, does not fit into the Kantian categorisa­
tion, as Hans-Georg Gadamer noted.15 In contrast to Kant, Gadamer re­
garded beauty as a value that is equivalent, or even identical, to truth, 
and he termed the way in which it exists ‘radiance’. In Gadamer’s con­
ception, the very existence of beauty is the manifestation, the illumina­
tion, the revelation of being.16 Given that, as Gadamer sees it, ‘The onto­
logical function of the beautiful is to bridge the chasm between the ideal 
and the real’,17 it comes as no surprise that in his understanding beauty 
is most fully manifest in works of art, the most privileged place of the 
manifestation and shining of beauty, and thereby of the truth of being.18 
Beauty -  realised in art -  is one of the forms of self-understanding.
One cannot fail to notice that in this way Gadamer, focussing his at­
tention on the value of the work, poses the question of the anthropologi­
cal basis of the experiencing of art.19 Its triadic structure, comprising the 
three notions of play, symbol and festival, contains implicitly the aspect 
of communication, of dialogue, of the forming of interpersonal ties built 
on the foundations of ethics. In the Gadamerian conception of the value 
of art, we may also find a discernible, albeit not salient, consonance with 
the anthropology of Karol Wojtyla: the work is an act, an experience that 
changes both its creator and its receiver. Gadamer’s view is also not far 
removed from Ingarden’s intuition of the radical unification of the subjec­
tive and objective aspects in the experiencing of art.20
The evoking of the axiological conception of the work of art formu­
lated by Gadamer is a consequence of choosing a line of reflection derived
15 See Elżbieta Wolicka, ‘Piękno pozoru. Dekonstrukcja wartości estetycznych w her­
meneutyce H.-G. Gadamera’ [The beauty of appearance. The deconstruction of aes­
thetic values in the hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer], in Człowiek wobec wartości 
[Man and value], ed. Jarosław Jagiełło and Władysław Zuziak (Kraków, 2006), 48-63.
16 Ibid., 53.
17 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays (Cam­
bridge, 1986), 15.
18 See Elżbieta Wolicka, 55.
19 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 22.
20 See Elżbieta Wolicka, 56-57.
from that place of interpretation which is the act of communication real­
ised in the work. This ‘communicational’ trail leads, in a roundabout 
way, to an essentially Platonic crowning of Gadamer’s construct: wher­
ever we come across a representation, manifestation, indication, depic­
tion or symbolisation, we are dealing with a manifestation or ‘flashing’ of 
the truth of being. But this is the flashing at the same time of beauty and 
good, since beauty is in essence a glimpse of the truth, and good is an as­
pect of the return of being to itself.
Treated separately, communication and value, which I have called 
(inspired by the title of Slawinski’s essay) two places of interpretation, 
would not provide sufficient grounds on which to consider the essence of 
the work of art, or of the work of music in particular. However, it has 
proved possible to clarify the notion of communication, to focus attention 
on its broader, anthropological aspect, which would be termed more cor­
rectly a communicational situation in which persons meet; the act of 
communication takes place within the field of responsibility. Yet this 
broad notion, encompassing not only art, directed our attention towards 
the question of the value of a work of art, providing reasons for locating it 
in another, broader perspective, not closed to the problems posed by an­
thropology and ethics. The notion of value, meanwhile, not restricted to 
aisthesis, but extended to embrace also the sphere of ethical questions, 
made it possible to clarify the nature of communication in the work of 
art: it is an act of communication in the world of value. The work is not 
so much the bearer, the conduit of value, as a place in which value be­
comes a message.
Translated by John Comber
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